Introduction
Consciousness is best understood in context, as one element of an interactive waking state in which the greater part of cognitive processing takes place in a nonconscious fashion. But if conscious and nonconscious processing are combined in the waking state, what distinguishes the former form the latter, what is consciousness, and what is its purpose? The answer to the second question depends crucially on our conclusion regarding the first. What is the property in virtue of which a state is conscious rather than nonconscious? In the following, it will be argued that of the answers most frequently proposed-intentionality, subjectivity, accessibility, reflexivity-only the final characteristic, reflexive, autonoetic awareness, is unique to the conscious state.
Reflexivity can best be explained not as the product of a self-representational data structure, but as the expression of a recursive processing regime, in which cognition registers the properties of the processing state to a greater extent than properties of the content represented. And the principal characteristic of a reflexive processing state is cognitive reflexivity or autonoetic awareness.
Consciousness is Reflexivity
Philosophy of mind, has over recent decades, been focused to a large extent on understanding consciousness as the expression of a particular cognitive modality-as the expression of either intentionality, accessibility, subjectivity or reflexivity. That is to say, consciousness has been equated either with (1) internal cognitive representation as such (intentionality); or (2) with the accessibility of primary informational content to various kinds of secondary processing (global broadcasting, logical thinking . . .); or (3) alternatively, on a minimalist interpretation of Nagel, with subjectivity or first-person perspective as such; or, finally and more recently (4), with reflexivity-the capacity for autonoetic or recursive, self-monitoring awareness-as the defining characteristic of consciousness. Of these four proposed primary indices of consciousness, however, only the latter-reflexivity-is unique to consciousness, while the other three features characterize intentional cognitive representation as such, both conscious and nonconscious.
Intentionality or representationalism holds that conscious awareness can basically be equated with representational activity as such.
1 However, as several critics have pointed out, 2 the assertion that conscious awareness and representational content are one and the same amounts to the claim that all intentional states are conscious as a consequence of their having intentional content, which in effect nullifies the distinction between conscious and unconscious representational states, and consequently fails as a distinguishing characteristic of the former.
Subjectivity was originally hailed as the index of consciousness by
Thomas Nagel, who claimed that if conscious mentality were not configured subjectively, there would be no conscious experience, there would not be something it is like for the organism to be that organism 3 . Some scholars have interpreted Nagel's terse, and somewhat enigmatic language to indicate that the 12 P. Carruthers, Language, Thought and Consciousness: an Essay in Philosophical Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) ; P. Carruthers all information has to be available for processing in some sense or the system would not function. In that sense, the conditions of access could be satisfied by a nonconscious computer 16 . As an explanation of what distinguishes consciousness, accessibility is essentially non-functional.
What then of reflexivity, of autonoetic (self-knowing) awareness? Unlike subjectivity, intentionality and accessibility, reflexivity is unique to consciousness, and not merely unique to but the very essence of consciousness.
The explicit "awareness of" or "knowing that" 17 one is perceiving, thinking, feeling or behaving in particular ways is the defining characteristic of the conscious state. Informally, the centrality of the autonoetic character is reflected in conventional linguistic usage as captured in the Oxford English Dictionary's definition of consciousness as "the reflex act whereby I know that I think, and that my thoughts and actions are my own and not another's." This formal definition merely embodies a common understanding whereby it is counterintuitive to claim that conscious experiences occur without the subject being aware of them 18 . More to the point, it is arguable that consciousnessconscious awareness of representational content-does not occur without there being a kind of reflexive, autonoetic awareness wherein whatever else the cognitive state might be aware of , it is intrinsically aware of its own occurrence.
That conscious states do so occur is evident from the fact that they arise with awareness of their own occurrence immediately and involuntarily, that is without the need for some elaborate post hoc process of inferring or reasoning that one is 17 David Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind (London: Routledge, 1968 That is, a prerequisite for being able to report that one is having (or has had) a conscious experience of this or that kind, one must be (or must have been)
consciously aware of it.
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Conversely, the principal distinguishing mark of nonconscious states is the lack of self-awareness, the absence of first-person knowability, the knowing that a particular experience is occurring. immediately reflexive consciousness and subsequent introspection and reflection; the former is not effortful while the latter requires deliberate effort to remain focused on just those inner mental events as opposed to external, perceptually-mediated content; the former is involuntary or automatic (you cannot choose not to be conscious) where the latter requires volition, is a matter of choice; the former is constant, ongoing, while the latter is temporary and intermittent; finally, the former is ubiquitous, self-aware at every moment where the latter is infrequent.They might have added that where consciousness includes both awareness of current perceptual input and ongoing internal commentary about that current situation-as well as part remembrances and future plans-introspective awareness refocuses attention only on the latter, internal display at the expense of perceptual awareness. Reflexivity, then, is the mechanism which establishes or generates conscious awareness of both internal and external inputs, while introspection merely focuses attention on a particular facet (internal mental information streams) of an already-conscious state. 22 Janzen (2008) whether reflexivity is a mere subjective seeming, or self-knowing in an empirically genuine fashion. As it turns out, there is good evidence that a state's being self-aware (immediately aware of its own occurrence) is a cognitive reality.
By way of general background, reflexivity can be understood as a refinement or variation of cognitive processing architecture which is built from the ground up on self-referential principles, because self-regulation of homeostasis through behaviour is the guiding principal of cognition as a whole. 24 That is to say, cognition extends the self-regulative homeostasis-maintaining capacity beyond the organism itself to the organism-environment interaction, by regulating selfmovement in relation to homeostatic and emotional needs of the organism.
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This self-regulating control of self-to-environment interaction is achieved through a cognitive system that is self-referencing in the sense of relating the outputs of various components to the needs of other components of the system. of that state such that I am able to know when I do or do not understand, remember or perceive such and such. Reflexive awareness then, can be accounted a genuine form of self-knowing in the form of self-perceiving.
Finally, where philosophy has concluded that self-awareness or "Iconsciousness" is genuinely immune to error through misidentification, psychology provides evidence that conscious self-awareness is immune to error through misattribution-that it is not possible to seem to be awake and reflexively self-aware without actually being so. "False awakening" is conventionally described as a nonconscious, dreaming subject who thinks she has awakened when in fact she has not. This conventional interpretation appears mistaken, however, based on the false assumption that dream content only arises in nonconscious sleep states. This is not the case. remembers details of one's waking life as being of one's waking life. 42 The fact that false awakening is in fact a genuinely awake state with dreamlike content can be taken as an indication that reflexive self-knowing cannot be simulated, that reflexivity is not a mere subjective seeming but a cognitive actuality.
Theories of Reflexivity
The principal factor differentiating conscious from nonconcious states, the primary index of consciousness as it were, can be accounted as reflexivity, immediate (pre-introspection), autonoetic awareness which is self-knowing in the sense that it is self-recognizing, self-knowing and self-perceiving. As the very essence of what it is to be conscious, reflexivity serves as a natural basis on which to judge the viability of current theories of consciousness. Which theories do and which do not recognize reflexivity as the principle constituent of consciousness, and of those that do, which explain the mechanisms which underlie the cognitive production of reflexivity?
40 Buzzi (2011) 
Reflexivity as Subjectivity
The most frequently encountered definition of consciousness was introduced by Nagel as being something it is like for the organism to be that organism.
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Nagel's somewhat enigmatic phrasing has been interpreted by some scholars as primarily referencing the subjectivity or first-person perspective of cognitive experience, without any reference to reflexivity. 44 By contrast to this straightforward reduction of conscious reflexivity to subjectivity, a second group of scholars-Zahavi, Janzen and Kriegel-clearly identify consciousness with subjective reflexivity, but relate reflexivity to subjectivity in distinctly opposite ways. Dan Zahavi overtly casts the central constituting characteristic of consciousness as reflexivity or self-awareness, stating that
[I]n much phenomenological literature, the discussion of self-awareness is not so much a discussion of how consciousness is aware of a self . . . as it is a discussion of how consciousness is aware of itself. . . . Consciousness is self-luminous. It is characterized by intentionality, but being intentionally aware of objects, it is simultaneously self-aware through and in itself. Its self-awareness is not due to a secondary act or reflex but is a constitutive moment of the experience itself, and consciousness can consequently be compared to a flame, which illuminates other things, and itself as well.
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He then goes on to claim, with Flanagan, that reflexivity is inherent in or an intrinsic concomitant of subjectivity:
[I]nsofar as there is something it is like for the subject to have experiences, there must be some awareness of these experiences themselves; in short, there must be self-awareness . . . Thus, in our view, phenomenal consciousness is simply a primitive type of self-awareness, and we can therefore only agree with Flanagan when he writes: '. . . all subjective experience is self-conscious in the weak sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have that experience. This involves a sense that the experience is the subject's experience, that it happens to her, occurs in her stream ' (Flanagan, 1992, p. 194) .
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Again, stressing the equivalence of "self-givenness" with "subjectivity", Zahavi reiterates that subjectivity entails or brings with it an intrinsic form of selfreferentiality or consciousness:
Mary might certainly realize that John is in pain, she might even sympathize with John, but she cannot actually feel John's pain the same way John does. Mary has no access to the first-personal givenness of John's experience. This is not something quite incidental to their being, a mere varnish that the experiences could lack without ceasing to be experiences. On the contrary, it is this first-personal givenness that makes the experiences subjective. To put it differently, with a slightly risky phrasing, their first-personal givenness entails a built-in selfreference, a primitive experiential self-referentiality.
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In linking self-awareness with subjectivity, Zahavi follows Husserl who, he says, "took self-awareness to be an essential feature of subjectivity." cognitive panpsychism would insist that a minimal form of conscious selfawareness accompanies every subjective cognitive act because subjectivity entails more than simply being the cognitive state (a la Stubenberg and Searle), more than an implicit registration of the world in relation to self (as with Van Gulick). Subjective cognition, they claim, has self-awareness, at least in some minimal form, because self-awareness is simply a fundamental property of subjective cognition. As Gennaro suggests, 51 this is this is presumably Nagel's position as well.
Zahavi and Janzen's claim that (minimal) self-awareness is inherent in every subjective cognitive act can be contrasted with the position of Kriegel, an intrinsic self-representational theorist, who insists on the polar opposite, that reflexivity is primary and subjectivity essentially a derivative expression of it.
Kriegel writes, It is unlikely there could be anything it is like for a subject to be in a mental state she is unaware of being in . The evidence indicates that neither of the abovementioned positions is an accurate portrayal: reflexivity is not inherent in subjectivity, nor is subjectivity merely an expression of reflexivity. Subjectivity and reflexivity are two distinct cognitive characteristics or properties such that while subjectivity characterizes all cognitive events, not all cognitive events are conscious. and therefore subjectivity is not the factor distinguishing conscious from nonconscious cognition. That is, all cognitive experience-whether conscious or unconscious-is subjective in the sense that it only exists for the subject operationalizing that cognitive state; the subject has literally to be (or be in) that cognitive state in order to realize or have access to those cognitive characteristics-no objective observer can apprehend or register another's thoughts feelings or sensations. In that sense at least, subjectivity is ontologically subjective as Searle maintains. 53 But not all subjectively-realized cognitive experience is necessarily conscious. mere sensory/perceptual engagement with the world ("worldly subjectivity), whereas consciousness involves awareness of one's experience of the world ("experiential" subjectivity). As a basic characteristic of cognition, subjectivity
is not intrinsically self-aware ( as Claimed by Flanagan, Zahavi and Janzen), nor certainly, dependent upon and merely a derivative expression of self-awareness (as claimed by Kriegel). As the basic substratum of all cognition, it lacks the critical ingredient that differentiates conscious from nonconscious states.
Higher-Order Theories of Reflexivity
Where first order accounts of consciousness discount or ignore reflexivity altogether, effectively removing the distinction between conscious and nonconscious states, higher order (HO) representational theories are explicitly focused on explaining this distinction in terms of the presence of a secondary 58 Farthing (1992) Higher-order source monitoring 67 invokes a species of executive processing.
Higher-order global state theory (HOGS) turns to an all-encompassing self-toworld representational state into which primary content is incorporated. 68 On the other hand, inner sense, or higher-order perception theories (at least those of Armstrong and Lycan), although normally included with the abovementioned approaches, should not be considered a higher-order construction like the others because they do not relate to the mechanism initially constructing or creating consciousness, but rather to the application of a subsequent metacognitive process-introspection--over an already-conscious state. 69 Conscious reflexivity, as noted above, is immediate and effortless, occurring without the need for deliberate post hoc inference, nor certainly any secondary introspective refocusing of attention.
The central proposition of all of the higher-order constructions is that consciousness is created as the result of a second order cognitive data structure (a thought, perception, judgement, feeling) being directed at or arising in relation to a first order cognitive event, such that the combination of these two cognitive states creates consciousness. But this claim has raised a host of objections, leading some analysts to question the basic viability of higher-order theory altogether. 70 The more significant criticisms include, firstly, that all 69 Higher-order theories are customarily addressed in terms of a contrast between HOT and HOP; the former approach involving a second-order thought-like state, and the latter a perception-like process "scanning" first order content. On closer inspection however, it is evident, that the two leading proponens of HOP (Lycan and Armstrong) have consistently pointed to introspection as the cognitive process that produces consciousness (Lycan (1996) On this basis, consciousness is independent of informational content:
consciousness is not equivalent to an awareness-of-qualia.
But higher-order theories are also seriously challenged in their effort to satisfactorily account for the generation of the reflexive awareness-of element even within the overall qualia (awareness-of-content) construct. Higher order theories attempt to account for this "awareness-of" in terms of "the mind directing its intentional aim upon its own states and operations" as Zahavi puts 71 For details see F. Peters, "Consciousness is Distinct From Qualia," Submitted, under review (2013b).
it. 72 However, crucially, the higher order construct itself which is supposed to supply the self-awareness is not itself self-aware, 73 so that the critical "awareness of" is purportedly generated by a nonconscious thought, belief, judgement or feeling which is about something other than itself. But beliefs, judgements, feelings and thoughts about something else all can and routinely do take place nonconsciously, 74 precisely because they are not inherently selfaware and do not engender self-awareness. The non-conscious status of the higher-order construct constitutes one of the most frequently voiced criticism of higher order theories, that a basically nonconscious cognitive construct cannot imbue consciousness in another nonconsious first-order construct or process 75 .
This criticism, commonly referred to as the problem of the rock, turns on the point that a rock doesn't become conscious simply by my looking at it, so why should a nonconscious cognitive data structure become conscious simply as a consequence of another data structure, or dispositional state being directed at it, (or being a representational redescription of it or simply being "about" it),
particularly if the latter, second-order construct is nonconscious as well?
This problem of the rock also constitutes the main stumbling block for 107) , and is therefore treated as such here. As he notes, however (2012: 3-4), his twoparts-within-one-state construct bears strong similarities to the mechanism proposed by Kriegel's intrinsic theory. According to the view of this paper, both approaches miss the mark when explaining consciousness as qualia, as opposed to reflexive awareness as such; but both are heading in the right direction in their emphasis on the importance of the processing regime, rather than basing the selfreferential capacity of consciousness solely on the representational content of data structures why a relocation of this same two-part mechanism within a single state would render the dynamic (one representational element being intentionally 'directed at' or simply about another element) capable of generating conscious selfawareness when it is unable to do so in a two-state configuration.
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Finally, it is basically questionable, in any case, whether higher order mental constructs (beliefs, percepts, thoughts, judgements), either extrinsic to the first-order state or intrinsic as in Gennaro's model, actually do monitor or arise in relation to first-order states one-on-one-and in fact, it seems they do not. Consciousness is unified not only synchronically but also diachronically -a constant flow. But the evidence from introspection 78 and thought sampling studies 79 is that while inner cognitive processing (thinking, daydreaming, remembering) does proceed in a more or less unbroken stream, it is not necessarily or even generally related to or directed toward the current perceptual input. These inner judgements, thoughts, beliefs and so on proceed more or less independently of first-order perceptual content, and are therefore not related to it in the way that higher-order theory requires. Moreover, even if that higherorder content were directed toward every instance of first-order input, there is (Gennaro 2004 (Gennaro :62-63, 2006 (1987-1988): 105-128. simply no possibility, analysts point out, that cognition has a store of higherorder conceptual constructs sufficiently varied to match the combinatorial possibilities of every distinct aspect of one's primary experience.
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The problem here is the almost total reliance on self-referential data structures of one sort or another as the generating instrument of phenomenal self-awareness. For not only is it the case that intentional data structures cannot cause first-order content to become conscious simply as a consequence of their being directed toward that first-order content (the problem of the rock), but neither can they reference themselves in an actively reflexive manner. This has to do with the direction of intentionality, the direction of cognitive reference in any and every representational data structure is antireflexive, referring away from the representing structure towards that which is represented, towards the content the state is about. It is this very other-directedness or "aboutness" which makes transparency (ignorance of the fact there is a representing vehicle) It may be reasonably concluded, then, that higher-order constructs do not arise to match first-order content one-on-one, and even if they did, it would lack the requisite capacity to give rise to consciousness. Higher-order theory is incapable of explaining conscious reflexivity.
Intrinsic or Self-Representational Theories of Reflexivity
Higher-order theory fails not because it has misconceived the primary reflexive characteristic of consciousness, but essentially because of its reliance on a twostate relational structure to achieve said reflexive self-awareness: where neither primary nor higher-order state is itself conscious, there simply is no possibility of generating the required reflexive awareness. What is needed, clearly, is not a representing of other things by the higher-order construct, not a subject-object, two-state structure, but a single-state, subject-subject structure, a representing of a cognitive state by itself to itself, a genuinely self-representational reflexive state. "Intrinsic" or "self-representational" (SR) theories insist that consciousness is indeed a matter of self-awareness not other-awareness; that consciousness is not a two-state cognitive construct, but a single reflexive selfrepresentational state. The locus classicus for this position is usually traced to Franz Brentano:
[Every conscious act] includes within it a consciousness of itself. Therefore, every
[conscious] act, no matter how simple, has a double object, a primary and a secondary object. The simplest act, for example the act of hearing, has as its primary object the sound, and for its secondary object, itself, the mental phenomenon in which the sound is heard.
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Moreover, he insists, the primary act of hearing and secondary awareness of that act inhere within a single mental state:
The presentation of the sound and the presentation of the presentation of the sound form a single mental phenomenon.... In the same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our minds we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself. What is more, we apprehend it in accordance with its dual nature insofar as it has the sound as content within it, and insofar as it has itself as content at the same time.
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This Brentanian notion of a single state with two parts, one directed outwards toward the world, and other inwards towards the state itself, has been recently adopted by several analysts. Janzen (2008) ; Kriegel (2007a) , (2009) In the case of SR theory, with its emphasis on a single, internally complex state construct, the problematic result of conflating consciousness with (http://philpapers.org/s/Thomas%20Natsoulas) in which he discusses various facets of intrinsic, "selfrepresentational" theory, but proposes no specific psychological mechanism for operationalizing this self-representational capacity. Thomasson (2000) , though nominally following Brentano, advocates a radical reinterpretation wherein the crucial self-awareness component of a conscious mental act is dropped and replaced with an adverbial notion (experiencing consciously). The result is a "conscious" experience "not in the sense that I am aware of it" (2000:203), which, lacking awareness, contravenes the conventional understanding of the term consciousness, and Brentano's understanding in particular (as discussed above). qualia is that it leads to a fundamental self-contradiction; for while all current SR theories explicitly acknowledge both nonconscious as well as conscious modes of cognitive processing, 87 the intrinsic self-representational position is essentially committed to the notion that all cognition is inevitably conscious.
Intrinsic theory insists that there is a single state wherein the being-aware-ofitself is intrinsic to and thus an ineluctable consequence of the first-order content state. Conscious self-awareness arises simultaneous with and as part of the first-order cognitive act, so that the resulting state is described as being aware of its object and of itself all at the same time and as of the same, singular, state. The first-order mental occurrence and second-order awareness of it, are, as Natsoulas puts it, "a single unmediated unity [where] neither of them has any existence apart from the other." 88 But then, if self-awareness is so utterly intrinsic to and co-existent with first-order content, how is it possible for firstorder states to arise non-consciously, without self-awareness, as they clearly do most of the time. Rosenthal (1997) : 745. The implication that all cognition is conscious may be an unfortunate legacy of adopting a Bretanian model of self-representation, since Brentano himself was convinced that all cognition is conscious: "every mental act . . . includes within it a consciousness of itself" (1874/1973, p. 153) . But the evidence does not support Brentano. The cognitive unconscious is a fact of mental life, and SR theory does not allow for this fact. Nor is it possible to argue that self-awareness does not necessarily arise with every first-order cognitive event, but when it does arise it does so simultaneously with and as part of that first-order event. If self-awareness does not arise in some cases, then some additional causative factor must be at work in those cases where it does, and that additional factor is unaccounted for in self-representational theory. If it were introduced, it would be extrinsic to the first-order state which
In addition to its inability to allow for nonconscious cognition, SR theory is also vunerable in relation to the adequacy of its accounting for consciousness itself. What concrete mechanism is being proposed to account for the reflexivity of the conscious component of the complex cognitive state? How is this self-representational capacity achieved? Janzen (2008) that is built into the intentional structure of conscious experience itself." 90 But as we have seen, subjectivity, while certainly a necessary part of reflexive consciousness does not, of itself, entail reflexivity because all cognitive actsconscious and unconscious-are realized subjectively.
Woodruff Smith 91 offers an enhanced version of Husserl's temporal layering of experience which consists of a synchronic perceptual moment, linked with a secondary retention of the just-past moment as well as anticipation ruins the intrinsic-ness of the theory. The dilemma is somewhat akin to the infinite regress problem attached to HOR theories where the higher-order construct must remain nonconscious, for if it were claimed to be conscious, it would require a yet higher construct to make it so, and so on ad infinitum. 90 Van Gulick (2004) ("protention") of the next moment. 92 Smith retains this temporal layering structure (current intentional moment, retention of just past moments and protentions of future moments) but he notes 93 Kriegel (2003b Kriegel ( ): 1 25, (2005 Kriegel ( ): 46, 51, (2007a and cf. Weisberg (2008): 166-7. 99 As Gennaro notes (2006 :235-236, 2012 3), Kriegel's support for the equation of consciousness with qualia (his cross-order integration construct involving the integration of awareness with first-order data content) stands in flagrant contradiction to his 2003a article devoted entirely to the proposition that consciousness is not qualia, not reflexive awareness of first order content ("sensory quality"), but inner self-awareness as such. His conclusion to that 2003 article reads: "[A]ccording to our account, for one's experience to be conscious at all, it must involve implicit self-awareness; but which specific kind of experience it is, is a matter of which sensory quale one is (implicitly) aware of one's experience as having. . . The upshot is that consciousness is not a matter of sensory qualia. . . .To devise a theory of consciousness, what we would have to explain is the phenomenon of permanent implicit self-awareness" (2003a:21) . Having argued at length and clearly demonstrated that sensory quality is neither sufficient nor even necessary for consciousness, his subsequent espousal of a qualia theory is inexplicable. There is, in addition, the perplexing fact that Kriegel, in his 2009 book (68-71, ff.) attempts to uphold the principle of transparency, which insists that state characteristics of an experience, such as conscious awareness itself, are "diaphanous" and unnoticed, not phenomenally explicit (you look through the state characteristics and see only the perceptual-conceptual-emotional content) while at the same time basing his theory of subjective awareness on the claim that we do, Brentano-style, experience the state of representing bluishness alongside the bluish sensory content. (2009: 109-110) . The latter is Smith's claim that consciousness has to do with state (modality) characteristics and not sensory qualities (mode), which Kriegel has consistently rejected (2003b Kriegel has consistently rejected ( , 2005 Kriegel has consistently rejected ( , 2009 
Reflexivity Derives From a Reflexive Processing Regime (not Self-Referential Data Structures)
It is becoming increasingly apparent that current attempts to explain the cognitive mechanism of reflexivity, both higher-order representation theories and intrinsic or self-representational theories, may well have reached an impasse, for lack of a viable mechanism, which is the critical enabling factor as 111 Levine (2010) Kriegel's admission (2009:230) that indirect (implicit) representation of the whole cognitive state is not phenomenally explicit (i.e. not conscious) is similar to an earlier admission (2005:50) that his crossorder integration construct does not achieve self-representational consciousness. He wrote:: "the crossorder information integration approach offers, in fact, a representationalist account of subjective character but one which does not appeal to self-representation. Instead, it suggests a way in which mental states that are not self-representing could have the sort of representational content that self-representing states would have. . . . It would be overly presumptuous to conclude from these remarks that cross-order information integration must be the key to the subjective character of conscious experience." 114 And this for two reasons, both of which derive from the almost universal reliance on intentional data structures of one sort or another as opposed to the way data structures are processed. The first problem is that for intentional data structures, the direction of intentionality, the direction of cognitive reference in any and every representational data structure is antireflexive . Consequently, even elaborate representational contortions (Husserlian iterations, Kriegel's implicit re-representations) do not succeed in overcoming this inherent antireflexivity of intentional representation. The second problem for current theories of reflexivity is that while intentional data structures cannot reference themselves in an actively reflexive manner, neither can they cause first-order content to become conscious simply as a consequence of their representing or being directed toward that first-order content.
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But if intentional data structures can neither reference themselves reflexively nor confer reflexivity on another, first-order structure, how is reflexivity to be achieved? The solution may lie not in the data structure but in the way it is processed. Both Gennaro 116 and Kriegel emphasize the capacity of a cognitive processing regime to create a genuinely new cognitive event.
Kriegel writes "if two states are united by a psychologically real process, that 114 Gennaro (2006):226ff. 115 Known as "the problem of the rock," discussed above Higher-Order Theories of Reflexivity; and see Levine (2006) : 22-23. 116 Gennaro (2006): 237-240. process would presumably affect the causal powers of the whole." 117 The particular mechanism they have both proposed, the integration of two data structures, is not actually associated with conscious processing-masked priming and subliminal perceptual integration both remain unconscious-and therefore integration is insufficient to the task. 118 Furthermore, even if integration were equal to the task, it is unclear how much of the phenomenological workload (generating self-awareness) is being performed by the processing regime and what percentage devolves upon the fact that the secondary data structure represents the primary act of world representation.
As to the first, the viability of reflexive processing, we have discussed above the self-referential character of cognitive architecture (serving the basic requirement for self-regulatory engagement with the environment), and the fact that cognitive systems have developed an even more proactive feed-forward or anticipatory form of self-reference in the form of predictive emulation architecture. This development is significant because predictive self-referential processing provides the basis for developing the capacity for the self-referential monitoring of a process by itself simply by rationalizing existing loops that update a current state with a predicted next state, into a more immediately recursive loop that updates a current state by a virtual copy of itself (see Peters, 2010, for detailed discussion). Predictive architectures already employ a more temporally extended form of recursion (recurrent self-reference) as a way of monitoring the capacity of motor outputs to achieve desired perceptual inputs.
Rationalizing this periodically self-referencing anticipative circuitry into a more immediately recursive, self-updating circuit simply repeats the original evolutionary emergence of fast predictive processing loops within slower motor-output-to-perceptual-feedback loops that form the basis of predictive processing architecture.
Recursive self-activation (or self-updating) at the neural level has the capacity to support reflexive self-knowing or self-awareness at the cognitive level, on the basis that reflexive self-awareness embodies a registration of state rather than content properties; in this case the reflexivity of the processing regime. The duration of this now-moment, in turn, is a direct reflection of the rate of sensorimotor sampling of the external world, or better, according to the rate of sensorimotor processing which includes sampling (Pockett, 2003) . The subjective sense of the duration of now expands and contracts as the rate of sensorimotor updating expands and contracts, but inversely; that is, a faster rate of updating generates more now moments in relation to the actual passage of the event -more subjective time is packed into the event -which makes it seem to be passing more slowly. Fewer updates of subjective now pack in less now moments, less time into an event which seems to pass more quickly.
The principal implication is that this sense of temporal duration reflects a registration of properties of the cognitive state (the rate of sampling which generates the state), not features of the particular objects which comprise the content of the represented event. Though it may not seem so, subjectively sensed time is actually a feature of the representing vehicle or state, not a quality or feature of the event represented much less the objects represented.
Taken in conjunction with the evidence, referenced above, that the conscious state does not consist in the awareness of representational content, that conscious is not qualia, we are left with the conclusion that consciousness must reflect a reading or registration of a state property, 128 in this instance the reflexive or autonoetic character of the state engineered by recursive processing circuitry.
Conclusion
The theory outlined above can be distinguished from existing higher-order and self-representational theories in terms of the allocation of phenomenal labour.
Where previous theories of consciousness as reflexivity rely wholly or in large measure on the self-referential intentionality of data structures 129 , the theory advanced here relies exclusively on the self-cognizing capacity of a recursive processing regime, that is, on the recursive manner of processing along with the fact that cognition is reading the features of that manner of processing. This could be understood as a return to the focus of earlier psychological theories which attempted to explicate consciousness as issuing from a particular kind of processing activity, as proposed by Johnson-Laird: "if consciousness depends on the computations of the nervous system, then it is likely to be a property of the algorithms that are used to carry out those computations rather than a property of their [informational] results." 130 Suggested processing mechanisms include the coordination of a central executive, attentional highlighting of informational content, internal linguistic commentary on perception, the comparison of sensory input with stored memory engrams, short term or working memory, the global broadcasting of information, the logical computation of meaningful symbols, action selection, source monitoring, and 129 Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory (1997), for example, relies totally on the referential content of data structures to generate the requisite "awareness that," while Gennaro (2006) and Kriegel (2007a) intoduce some measure of reliance on the processing regime involved. In the pantheon of consciousness theories, this solution would best be described as a reflexive state theory. As opposed to theories which envisage consciousness as qualia, wherein consciousness arises either as intentional representation per se (FOR theories), or as intentional representation that is object of higher order representation (HOR theories), or a self-representing element of a complex state (Intrinsic Self Representational theories), reflexive state theory characterizes consciousness as an actively self-cognizing state extrinsic to primary informational streams. Rather than the self-representational cognitive structure being conjoined to, arising as part of, or being directed at primary informational content in some fashion, the direction of fit is reversed:
conscious self-awareness is independently generated and that portion of unconscious processing which is directed to (or permitted access into) this state 133 Flohr (1995):160. becomes incorporated 134 into the reflexive state and consequently partakes of the reflexive quality of the state. But regardless of the amount or type of primary information currently incorporated, the reflexive state remains a cognitive entity distinct from that content because independently constituted as a consequence of the registration or reading of state rather than of content properties. Consequently, the principal property of a recursive processing state is reflexive or autonoetic awareness-consciousness. 134 Other incorporational models include those of Metzinger (2000), Dennett (1991) , , and Antii Revonsuo, Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2005) . But all envisage consciousness as something other than a reflexive autonoetic state. The first two envisage information becoming conscious when incorporated into a spatiotemporal array which is somehow "conscious" in virtue of its spatiality (Revonsuo (2005):123) or its status as the highest order model (Metzinger (2000):. 289-290, 299). Daniel Dennett's 1991 "multiple drafts" theory of consciousness models the recruitment of content into an ongoing serial narrative, which for Dennett, as for Metzinger and Revonsuo, does not amount to a reflexively self-aware state, but is nominated "conscious" nonetheless. For van Gulick, individual phenomenal elements are subsumed within the larger conscious state, which, however, is conscious simply in virtue of being subjective ):19-20, (2006 . However, as discussed above (Reflexivity as Subjectivity), subjectivity characterizes all cognition but is insufficient to explain reflexive conscious cognition.
